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from individual experience with that derived from observing the actions of others. This raises the question
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Social information influences decision-making through an integration of information derived from individual experience with that derived from observing
the actions of others. This raises the question as to which extent one should utilize social information. One strategy is to make use of uncertainty
estimates, leading to a copy-when-uncertain strategy that weights information from individual and social sources based on their respective reliabilities.
Here, we investigate this integration process by extending models of Bayes optimal integration of sensory information to a social decision context. We
then use a key parameter of our behavioral model in conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural substrate that is
specifically linked to the fidelity of this integration process. We show that individuals behave near Bayes optimal when integrating two distinct sources
of social information but systematically deviate from Bayes optimal choice when integrating individual with social information. This systematic behav-
ioral deviation from optimality is linked to activity of left inferior frontal gyrus. Thus, an ability to optimally exploit social information depends on
processes that overcome an egocentric bias, and this regulatory role involves the left inferior prefrontal cortex. The findings provide a mechanistic
explanation for observations wherein individuals neglect the benefits from exploiting social information.
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INTRODUCTION
Our decisions benefit from a constant stream of social information
that includes the vicarious observation of the actions and outcomes
of actions of others (Rendell et al., 2011). This type of influence pro-
vides a rich underpinning to much of human culture (Dean et al.,
2012). Under a broad range of conditions, copying the actions of
others results in the adoption of advantageous behavioral traits
(Rendell et al., 2010). When observed actions, and their outcomes,
are closely conjoined these stimulus response contingencies seem to
be associatively learned using the very same prediction errors that
underpin associative learning for non-social stimuli (Behrens et al.,
2008; Burke et al., 2010; Heyes, 2012).
The influence of social information is often biased (Mesoudi et al.,
2006) and modulated by context and individual predisposition (Alevy
et al., 2007; Efferson et al., 2008; Toelch et al., 2009). This raises a
fundamental question as to how individuals weight social and individ-
ual information in a decision-making context. One proposal is that a
copy-when-uncertain strategy can account for situations wherein indi-
vidually acquired information is imprecise. An unbiased account of
this strategy suggests that each information source is weighted by its
corresponding reliability with distinct information sources subse-
quently combined in a Bayes optimal (BO) manner. This type of in-
tegration process is evident in multi modal cue integration (Ernst and
Banks, 2002; Alais and Burr, 2004; Knill and Pouget, 2004), as well as
in joint decision making where participants appear to use a confidence
metric to arrive at a BO response in perceptual tasks (Bahrami et al.,
2010) cf. (Koriat, 2012).
When individuals have to integrate social and individual informa-
tion, however, there appears to be a strong preference for individual
information (Eriksson and Strimling, 2009; Morgan et al. 2012; Heyes,
2012) even when social information use is advantageous. Here, we
propose that individuals over discount social information proportional
to the reliability of their own information to account for the uncer-
tainty inherent in social information (Rieucau and Giraldeau, 2011).
We provide an experimental test for such a modified copy-when-un-
certain strategy. The experimental manipulation of individual uncer-
tainty estimates and with that the hypothesized differential use of social
information opens up the possibility to index a neural basis for reg-
ulating the interplay of individual and social information. For this, we
use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in conjunction
with behavioral modeling of player choices where the focus is on in-
dividual differences in social information use. In brief, our task
required players to solve a perceptual task where they had to guess
the location of a briefly flashed stimulus (Figure 1). In the first phase,
players could assess their own accuracy as well as the accuracy of two
players, one with high and one with low accuracy, through feedback as
to the correct location (after they made a choice). In a second phase,
conducted in an fMRI scanner, participants received information (in-
dividual and/or social) generated in the first phase and made a second
guess on the position of the stimulus but now without receiving feed-
back on its actual true position. We modeled players’ choices using BO
cue integration models. Parameters derived from these models were
then used as regressors in a model-based fMRI analysis to identify
brain areas critically linked to this modulation of choice.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-nine participants (19–42 years, 17 females) were recruited via
posters and paid E25 each for participation. All were right-handed and
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision in the scanner. Participants
reported no previous history of neurological or psychiatric illness.
Before beginning, written instructions were given and participants
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were allowed to ask questions. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants. The procedures and questionnaires
were approved by the Medical Ethics Review Committee of the
Charité University Hospital (protocol number EA4/042/12).
Experimental task
The task consisted of an initial training phase (20 trials) followed by
two experimental phases (120 and 240 trials) and lasted all in all ap-
proximately 2 h. The training and first phase involved guessing the
location of a stimulus that briefly flashed on the screen (Figure 1),
whereas in the second phase players had to make a second guess based
on their decisions from the first phase without seeing the stimulus
again. The second phase was conducted inside the scanner.
Participants were told via instructions that part of their remuneration
(up to E9) depended on their decisions in both phases with an
emphasis on the second phase (see Electronic Supplementary
Material (ESM)). After the experiments, all participants received a
fixed amount that amounted to almost the maximum possible.
Training phase and first experimental phase
Each trial commenced by subjects pressing a key. After 1 to 2 s,
a stimulus (filled circle) was briefly flashed (50ms) on the outline
of a pre-drawn circle on a computer screen (Figure 1). Immediately
after stimulus presentation, distracter stimuli were displayed on
the outline of the empty circle for 3 s. During this interval, the
mouse pointer slowly moved from the center to the edge of
the screen. Players were instructed to keep the pointer in the center
of the screen or otherwise they would lose points. This manipulation
prevented players from executing a saccade to the target loca-
tion and fixate on the target location. Pilot studies showed that
this difficulty level ensured inter individual variability in player accur-
acy. Participants then had to make a guess where on the outer circle
the stimulus had appeared. Their guess was displayed as a small red
circle.
In the first experimental phase, players saw, additional to their
own choice, a green and a yellow circle representing the choices of
two other players that were recorded in a pilot. The other players were
selected from a pilot based on their accuracy with one player being
more accurate than the other. To assess their own and other
players accuracy, the subjects also saw a white circle representing
the actual position of the flashed stimulus. Social players were not
selected from the extremes of the available players from the pilot but
had distinct average accuracies with a standard deviation of 15 degrees























Fig. 1 In phase 1 (120 trials), players assessed their own accuracy and the accuracy of two other players in a perceptual task where they had to guess the position of a briefly (50 ms) flashed stimulus. After
observing the stimulus, several distracter stimuli appeared in quick succession in random locations along the circumference of the circle. During the whole time, players had to center their mouse pointer that
was slowly moved by the computer in one direction. After this, players had to guess the position of the previously presented briefly flashed stimulus. They also saw the decisions of the two other players as well
as the actual true position of the stimulus. In phase 2, there was no flashed target stimulus. Instead, players received information from phase 1. This was always a combination of two guesses consisting of
either individual information (red) or social information (green and yellow). This led to four conditions (60 trials each); individual information paired either with high (I:SHIGH) or low (I:SLOW) accuracy social
information, a condition with two social information pieces combined (SLOW:SHIGH) and a condition with only individual information (I:I). Based on this information, players then made a second guess (blue) as to
the position of the stimulus but in this phase received no feedback.















































































This phase was conducted within the environment of an MRI scanner.
Each trial started after an inter trial interval during which only a small
cross was visible on the center of the screen. In this phase, players
viewed choices from trials from the first experimental phase in a ran-
domized order. In each trial, players received two pieces of information
to inform a second guess on where the stimulus was located but
received no feedback on the actual position of the stimulus. There
were four information pairs; their own guess paired with a guess of
either the low accuracy or high accuracy demonstrator (I:SLOW and
I:SHIGH). Players also played trials where they received information
from the two social players without having to integrate their own in-
formation (SLOW:SHIGH). They also received pairs that consisted of
their own guesses alone (I:I). This was rendered possible as we pre-
sented players with a set of 60 stimuli in the first experimental phase
that were in fact presented twice in randomized order. That is, that two
guesses for each player were available for each stimulus location.
Players were informed of this manipulation.
Thus, each condition entailed 60 trials. Players had 6 s to respond.
The inter trial intervals (mean¼ 5 s; Min¼ 4 s; Max¼ 8 s) and order of
trials were determined via randomization methods outlined in
(Henson, 2007) to maximize the variance in the blood-oxygenation-
level-dependent (BOLD) signal and at the same time reduce the dur-
ation of the experiment. In this phase, players used a response box to
choose the assumed position of the stimulus moving a blue circle along
the outer larger circle by using two of the response box buttons for left
and right movement and one button to select (Figure 1). The blue
circle started randomly near one of the two circles representing
the information from phase 1 so that the movement duration was
independent of condition. We compared reaction times between
conditions using a generalized linear mixed model assuming an error
structure from the gamma distribution family. We entered the four
conditions as well as the distance the blue dot was moved in a round as
dependent factors. We modeled player identity as a random effect on
the intercept.
Image acquisition and analysis
Whole brain T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging BOLD fMRI data were
acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T (Siemens Medical Solutions,
Erlangen, Germany) magnetic resonance scanner using a 12-channel
head matrix coil, with 33 slices recorded in descending order (64 64
voxels; resolution 3mm 3mm 3.5mm slices), a volume repetition
time (TR) of 2000ms, an echo time of 30ms. The fMRI data were
preprocessed and analyzed in an event-related manner with SPM8
software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK).
Preprocessing consisted of slice-time correction, spatial realignment,
co-registration to the participants’ T1 image, normalization to
Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates via the new segment pro-
cedure in SPM8, and spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel with a
full width at half-maximum of 8mm. We modeled each trial with a
boxcar function at the trial onset with reaction time as length of the
boxcar. For each of the four conditions, we created one regressor that
was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. To
correct for motion-related artifacts, we modeled subject-specific re-
alignment parameters as nuisance regressors. Additionally, we explored
models where the distance between the two points was modeled as
parametric modulator to detect neuronal correlates of uncertainty dif-
ferences stemming from varying distance between the two points.
These models did not yield any additional insights.
Linear contrasts of regression coefficients were computed at the in-
dividual subject level and then taken to a group-level random-effects
analysis. We applied whole-brain family-wise error (FWE) correction
for multiple comparisons on the basis of random field theory. We used
a cluster FWE-corrected threshold of P<0.05, on the basis of a voxel-
wise threshold of P< 0.001 uncorrected. Subjects were scanned in two
sessions of 120 trials interspersed by a T1-weighted structural scan.
Behavioral model fitting
We modeled player decisions in the second phase using maximum
likelihood methods to individual player data for decisions that
involved an integration of different information (excluding the I:I
condition). Players had two different types of information available
namely (i) the distance between the two displayed choices (Dini) and
(ii) their estimate of their own accuracy (accI) and the accuracy of the
social players (accS). On the basis of this information, they made a
second choice that usually deviated by a certain degree from their
initial choice. The models differ with regard to whether and how
these two information types are taken into account when determining
the degree to which a players’ decision deviated from the initial choice
(Dfin). We chose the position of the individual information as refer-
ence to determine how far the player moved his second choice for the
I:S conditions. For the SLOW:SHIGH condition, we used the position of
the low reliability player as reference. Note here that changing the
reference does not impact on the outputs of the modeling process.
We restricted our model analysis to cases where Dini was below 30
degrees which led to an exclusion of 5.5% of the trials from the mod-
eling process. Above this threshold, it was clear to players that only one
point was reliable and that the other point had to be an erroneous
choice stemming from a lapse of concentration during the game.
Players would thus not integrate but perform a two alternative
forced choice task. The cutoff also accounts for findings from percep-
tional cue integration that show a non-linear relationship between cues
when cues are too dissimilar [see robust weak fusion (Maloney and
Landy, 1989)].
In general, we distinguished two model families; first, models where
participants’ decisions were BO or modified BO and, second, models
where participants decided using an (unknown) heuristic. We had
already tested this set of models in a purely behavioral pilot study
with 23 participants and the same experimental setup where 18 out
of 23 participants used a (modified) BO strategy. This pilot was then
used to derive our hypotheses about the possible model space. An
additional behavioral control was conducted to ensure that results
were robust to the actual presence/absence of partners with regard to
the integration of social and individual information (see ESM).
BO models
This model family describes a BO strategy derived from work on the
integration of information in multi-modal perception tasks (Alais and
Burr, 2004). The deviation of final from initial choice is weighted (!)
by the accuracy of the available information (individual: accI, social:
accS) represented in the variance of the deviation between choice and
correct location during phase 1. All models are based on a pure BO
model where players correctly estimate the accuracy of the social in-
formation and decided in a BO manner (equation 1). Here, more
weight is given to individual information when the accuracy of the
social players is low and vice versa. For the three integration condi-
tions, ! changes based on the two information types involved
(equations 2–4)
Dfin ¼ !  Dini ð1Þ
!I:SLOW ¼ accIð Þ= accI þ accSLOWð Þ ð2Þ
!I:SHIGH ¼ accIð Þ= accI þ accSHIGHð Þ ð3Þ














































































!SLOW:SHIGH ¼ accSLOWð Þ= accSLOW þ accSHIGHð Þ ð4Þ
BO with individual and/or social error (BOmod)
We extended the BO model to allow for the possibility that players
estimated their own information and/or one of the social players sys-
tematically better or worse than the actual accuracy. This led to five
additional models where we allowed for a scaling of the accuracy of
one social player or the accuracy of an individual player or both. We
added one or two free parameters (ks, ki or both) that scaled the social
and individual accuracy (equation 1 with equation 5 through 7 for
scaling of individual and low accuracy social player). As it is possible
that players misjudged either of the social players, we calculated two
models where ks either modified the low accuracy social player or the
high accuracy player.
!I:SLOW ¼ ki  accIÞ= ki  accI þ ks  accSLOWð Þð ð5Þ
!I:SHIGH ¼ ki  accIÞ= ki  accI þ accSHIGHð Þð ð6Þ
!SLOW:SHIGH ¼ ks  accSLOWð Þ= ks  accSLOW þ accSHIGHð Þ ð7Þ
For modeling our fMRI data (discussed later), we chose the ki from
the BO model with an accuracy adjustment ks for the high accuracy




Players engaging in this strategy will take the distance between the
two choices into account (Dfin), but not the different accuracies
of each player. This leads to higher deviations with higher distance
between the two choices independent of the accuracy (equation 8).
This model is equivalent to a linear regression modeling one
slope for the relationship between Dini and Dfin and omitting the
intercept.
Dfin ¼   Dini ð8Þ
Full model with three independent slopes
Some players reacted in all three conditions in a different manner
which made it difficult to ascertain which strategy they used. This
model captures this possibility and allows for three different slope
parameters () for each condition i (equation 9) again omitting an
intercept.
Dfin ¼ i  Dini ð9Þ
Model selection was based on Bayesian information criterion (see
ESM for details). To link our modeling results to our fMRI analysis, we
entered the inverse of ki as a regressor in our 2nd level fMRI random
effects analysis. As we expected larger differences between the purely
social information (S:S) and mixed information type conditions (I:S)
for players neglecting social information, this transformation ensured
that high values entered in our random effects analysis were associated
with players who underexploited social information. We had no spe-
cific a priori hypothesis about the effect of ks and decided against an
exploratory analysis of correlated brain activations with different levels
of ks.
RESULTS
Players exploited information provided in phase 2 to increase their
accuracy (variance of deviation from the correct location) compared
with phase 1 [phase 1: medianmedian adjusted deviation
(MAD)¼ 80.56 50.52; phase 2: medianMAD¼ 53.81 23.18;
Wilcoxon-signed rank test: V¼ 407, n¼ 29, P<0.001]. Reaction
times between conditions were significantly lower in the I:I condition,
but only by 0.5 s (Figure 2a). For each individual player, we derived the
BO response from their own accuracy during phase 1 and the social
players’ accuracy scores (equation 1). We then fitted separate linear
regression to each integration conditions (i.e. I:SLOW, I:SHIGH,
SLOW:SHIGH; equal to equation 9) with the difference between the
two stimuli on the circle as independent and the distance between
choice and reference stimulus after the decision as dependent variables.
When comparing these two measures, we found that players deviated
little from BO choice in the SLOW:SHIGH condition, whereas the ma-
jority of players underused social information in the I:S conditions
(Figure 2b). The suboptimal use of social information was correlated
with player’s own accuracy in phase 1 providing evidence that confi-
dence in individual information was indeed modulated by players’
estimation of their accuracy in phase 1 (Figure 2c).
Model results
For most players (n¼ 20), one model from the BO model set was
supported by the data over and above models based on non-
Bayesian strategies (BIC weights: BO models: mean s.d.¼ 0.67 0.4;
accuracy independent deviation: 0.12 0.3; full model with three in-
dependent slopes: 0.2 0.34). In eight cases, however, BO models were
not supported unequivocally, e.g. when players used a heuristic that
involved always placing their decisions at the midpoint between the
two circles, independent of condition. These players were excluded
from the subsequent fMRI analysis because their strategy deviated
from that of other players in a manner that precluded their contribu-
tion to addressing our main imaging questions. One additional player
was excluded because choices in the I:I condition were not consistently
placed in the middle between the two stimuli. For the other players, we
derived the estimate how strongly they modified their own accuracy of
ki from equations (5) and (6). In general, models confirmed that
players underused social information when integrating social and in-
dividual information with ki values significantly below one
(MedianMAD¼ 0.78 0.56; Wilcoxon signed rank test; V¼ 128,
P¼ 0.041, n¼ 29). Here, low ki values denoted a bias for individual
information. As we were interested in a measurement of how strongly




as a covariate in our random effects fMRI model. This led to high
values denoting a strong neglect of social information. The appropri-
ateness of our choice of covariate is further supported by the strong
correlation between k1
i
and players’ accuracy scores in phase 1
(Kendall’s Rank correlation: T¼ 282, P¼ 0.002, ¼ 0.39, n¼ 29).
The model estimate for the bias for social information (ks) was not
significantly different from one (medianMAD¼ 1.0 0.24;
Wilcoxon-signed rank test; V¼ 221, P¼ 0.95, n¼ 29). That is, our
model results uphold our observations that players decided near BO
in the S:S condition.
fMRI results
A comparison of activations associated with exploitation of individual
information alone (I:I) and conditions requiring integration of infor-
mation (I:S and S:S) revealed significant activation in precuneus, right
medial parietal lobe, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, left dorsolateral
and bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal (VLPFC) regions (Table 1).
There were no significant differences above the threshold criterion in
activation between the I:S condition and the S:S condition indicating
that similar processes were involved in both conditions.
As we were primarily interested in the neural substrate moderating
the integration of individual and social information, we entered our














































































estimate for how strongly individuals relied on individual information
(k1
i
) as a covariate into the contrast S:S> I:S. Here, we found a sig-
nificant positive correlation with the level of differential activation in
the left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG). That is, players with a relatively
lower activation in the lIFG showed less efficient integration of social
and individual information. One local maximum located to the pars
triangularis (MNI: 44 20 2; cluster size: 299; P¼ 0.033; FWE
corrected) and a second local maximum located to pars opercularis
(MNI: 52 14 14) (Figure 3). Note that this entire region showed a
partial overlap with the VLPFC, we found for the contrast between I:I
and the integration conditions (I:S and S:S).
DISCUSSION
Our findings highlight that subjects use a copy-when-uncertain strategy,




Fig. 2 (a) Players reacted faster in the I:I condition. A linear mixed model with error structure based on a gamma distribution with condition and the distance players moved the circle for their second choice as
fixed effects and player identity as random effect on the intercept showed a significant difference between the I:I and other conditions (contrast I:I< I:SLow: z¼ 14.43; P< 0.001; I:I< I:SHigh: z¼ 9.87;
P< 0.001; I:I< SHigh:SLow: z¼ 10.96; P< 0.001; n¼ 29). (b) Players deviated from BO choice in the conditions that included individual information. In contrast, they responded near BO in the condition where
social information alone was presented. Deviation from BO choice was determined by DBO¼ 0.5 [(slopeREG)/(slopeBOþ slopeREG)], with slopeREG derived from a linear regression for each condition (i from
equation 8) and slopeBO calculated from the corresponding accuracies (! from equation 1) (n¼ 29). Boxplots in (a) and (b) show median and box ranges from first to third quartile. Whiskers cover an
additional 1.5 inter quartile range each. All data points outside this range (outliers) are represented as black dots. (c) Players deviate stronger from BO choice in the I:S conditions when they had achieved high
accuracy scores in phase 1 (Correlation between deviation from BO choice in phase 2 and accuracy in phase 1 via Kendall Rank correlation: I:SHIGH: T¼ 273, P¼ 0.008, ¼ 0.34; I:SLOW: T¼ 348, P< 0.001,
¼ 0.71, n¼ 29). Left panel depicts I:SHIGH condition, right panel I:SLOW condition. Vertical lines illustrate the accuracy of the two social players.














































































Galef et al., 2008) and humans (Weizsäcker, 2010; Morgan et al. 2012)
alike. Information from social sources alone is integrated in a near BO
manner with the weight given to each source scaling with its respective
reliability. Crucially, an integration of individual information and
social information deviates systematically from Bayes optimality,
with individual information consistently weighted more heavily
across the I:S conditions. Crucially, the over-proportional weight
given to individual information scaled with the accuracy of individual
information.
We deliberately deviated in our experimental design from 2AFC
tasks like informational cascades experiments (Bikhchandani et al.,
1992) where individual skill differences are minimal or not task rele-
vant. This enabled us to model the relationship between uncertainty,
variance of player decisions, and social information use to reveal a
clear relationship between the two in individual decisions. This em-
phasis on individual non-joint decision making distinguishes our ap-
proach from those that depend on verbally expressed confidence
statements that explicitly address metacognitive abilities (Bahrami
et al., 2010). Importantly, we established that deviation from Bayes
optimality is not due to task-specific constraints because players inte-
grated in a near BO manner when presented with information from
two social players. Moreover, a control experiment that involved direct
interaction of players and actual information from these players
showed behavioral results matching the findings from the fMRI ex-
periment (see ESM). That is, subjects in the scanner reacted similarly
to situations involving direct social interaction.
At the level of brain function, we identified patterns of activation
between a control condition (I:I) and conditions requiring integration
of two information sources that are engaged in social decision-making
tasks and in the exertion of cognitive control. For example, the pre-
cuneus is implicated in self-referential processing when comparing
oneself with others (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006) or when taking a
third person perspective (Vogeley et al., 2004). The dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex is involved in social cognition across various tasks
(Amodio and Frith, 2006) while VLPFC and DLPFC are linked to
executive control of behavior (Tanji and Hoshi, 2008). At the same
time, there is no above threshold activation in areas typically associated
with mentalizing about others, for example the right temporoparietal
junction (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). This raises the question
as to whether participants would have reacted differently when con-
fronted with computer-generated information instead of real partici-
pants’ decisions. Differences in behavior and neuronal activation
between conditions with human or computer agents arise when par-
ticipants make inferences about the goals of their partner (Rilling et al.,
2004). In our experiment, participants process observational informa-
tion that was obtained inadvertently without a signaling intention of
their partner or need to infer such an intention. In such cases, there is
no activation difference between conditions with a computer or
human actor with regard to the brain regions identified in our basic
contrast (Chaminade et al., 2012). Moreover, individuals often use
strategies toward a computer controlled agent that are similar to
those in real social contexts (Nass and Moon, 2000). It is thus likely
that a computer control would not yield qualitatively different results.
To ascribe functional specificity to the observed brain activation
patterns, we adopted the strategy of exploiting individual differences
in player accuracy that arose out of varying systematic uncertainty
estimates between individuals. As all players integrated two social in-
formation sources in an almost BO fashion, we expected less engage-
ment of regions responsible for the integration process in the I:S
relative to the S:S condition for players who neglected social informa-
tion (high individual accuracy). This allowed us to identify lIFG as the
sole region modulated by the degree that players overvalued their own
information relative to the social information. Similar levels of activity
were seen in this region when players integrated individual and social
information in an optimal manner while for players who neglected
social information there was less engagement of this region. This sug-
gests that this region exerts a regulatory role wherein greater engage-
ment is associated with increasingly efficient integration of social and
individual information. This fits with its known involvement in pro-
cesses such as control of memory retrieval or cue conflict in working
memory (Badre and Wagner, 2007) and specifically for representing
the ambiguity of a cue (Bach et al., 2009). This region is also implicated
in response inhibition, evident for example in patients with lesions to
this regions who manifest impaired performance in go/no go tasks
Table 1 Conditions involving social information showing greater activation than the individual information alone condition (P< 0.001 on voxel level and P< 0.05 FWE error corrected on
cluster level
Cluster Peak Regions
P FWE-corr Cluster size T statistic x y z L/R
<0.0001 3159 6.68 8 66 38 R Precuneus
6.30 2 58 44 R Precuneus
5.73 6 54 60 R Precuneus
0.00036 649 6.48 38 22 22 L IFG (p. Triangularis)
5.24 30 24 4 L Insular cortex
5.10 34 18 8 L Insular cortex
0.01529 317 6.10 52 62 14 R Middle temporal gyrus
0.04154 242 5.71 46 70 16 L Middle occipital gyrus
5.31 40 76 18 L Middle occipital gyrus
4.33 34 70 22 L Middle occipital gyrus
<0.0001 1807 5.62 10 10 52 R SMA
5.20 36 16 24 R IFG (p. Triangularis)
5.17 44 28 26 R IFG (p. Triangularis)
<0.0001 793 5.38 32 2 54 L Precentral gyrus
4.86 22 0 62 L Superior frontal gyrus
4.52 42 0 36 L Precentral gyrus
0.00064 593 5.22 30 26 2
5.10 30 40 12
5.09 32 42 20 R Middle frontal gyrus
Coordinates in MNI space. SMA, supplementary motor area.














































































(Swick et al., 2008). Moreover, the IFG in conjunction with the sub-
thalamic nucleus is critical for instrumental control to overrule
Pavlovian influences (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).
In our study, the IFG is engaged if individual information is not
overvalued relative to social information where it may exert an inhibi-
tory influence on responses based on individual information alone.
Thus, engagement of this region may allow participants to appropri-
ately exploit information from other sources so as to make an im-
proved, near optimal choice. This interpretation is consistent with
findings for a mediating role of the lIFG in control processes when
subjects need to decide between healthy and unhealthy food options
(Hare et al., 2009). One upshot is that the brain areas we highlight as
being recruited for integration of social information are in fact com-
ponents of a network that is fundamental to decision-making under
uncertainty (Platt and Huettel, 2008; Bach and Dolan, 2012).
In conclusion, we show that individuals combine distinct sources of
social information in a Bayes optimally manner, but when required to
integrate individual and social information they are biased toward a
reliance on individual information when the latter is highly accurate.
In other words in the latter context, there is a strong prior on indi-
vidual information. Theoretical work on decision-making under un-
certainty shows strong priors are to be expected when the cost for
making a mistake outweighs the benefit of improving the decision
(Trimmer et al., 2011). In our case, the benefits in refining a decision
when an individual decision is already accurate are comparably low,
such that taking social information into account carries unnecessary
risks. This accords with theoretical accounts on the evolution of social
learning where social information, even though available at no cost,
embodies a degree of hazard such as the risk of being outdated in
variable environments (Kameda and Nakanishi, 2003; Rieucau and
Giraldeau, 2011). The intriguing possibility is that humans have
evolved stronger priors for individual than social information because
a slight overestimation of individual skill and prowess is highly adap-
tive across a wide range of conditions (Johnson and Fowler, 2011).
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